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Comment

Hiding in Plain Sight: Protection from GPS
Technology Requires Congressional Action,
Not a Stretch of the Fourth Amendment

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 2010, a college student in Santa Clara, California, found
a peculiar object on the underside of his vehicle after a trip to the
mechanic.' The student's friend posted an online picture of the strange
device asking for suggestions about its source and "if it mean[t] the
[Federal Bureau of Investigation] 'is after us.'"2 As it turns out, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was secretly tracking the twentyyear-old Arab-American using a Global Positioning System (GPS) affixed
to the underside of his vehicle.3 The FBI located the student two days
after the posting and demanded the return of their expensive device.'
At the same time, federal agents spoke to the student in his native
language, Arabic, about the restaurants he frequented, his new job, and

1. Kim Zetter, FBIAllegedly Caught Using GPS to Spy on Student, CNN (Oct. 8, 2010),
httpJ/www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/gaming.gadgets/10/08/fbi.tracks.student.wired/index.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
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how his recent trip to the mechanic triggered their belief that the device
had been removed.' Ultimately, the FBI reassured the student he had
nothing to worry about, and that he was, in fact, "boring. "6
The event, however, was anything but mundane to the American
public; on the heels of several recent United States Courts of Appeals
decisions, the event re-ignited the debate over the constitutionality of
law enforcement's warrantless use of GPS devices.' GPS devices, which
can keep a continuous log of a person's precise location, have the
capability to "provide a detailed picture of one's life."' In the absence
of a clear direction from either the Supreme Court of the United States
or the United States Congress, state and federal courts are left to
grapple with the issue of whether law enforcement's surreptitious use of
GPS technology to track a suspect's location constitutes a "search,"
thereby activating Fourth Amendment' protections. Using their own
state constitutions as a platform, the higher courts in the states of
Washington, New York, and Massachusetts have deemed the warrantless use of a GPS device a search or the installation itself a seizure."o
While the federal courts have generally held GPS tracking does not
invoke the protections of the Fourth Amendment, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in United States
v. Maynard,n recently became the first circuit court to hold that the
warrantless, prolonged use of a GPS device to track a defendant's
movements violated the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy."
This Comment seeks to demonstrate how the underpinning of the
Supreme Court's definition of a search-whether society is willing to find
an expectation of privacy reasonable-is not an appropriate standard for
protection against "the all-seeing network of GPS satellites that hover

5. Id.
6. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United States
v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010).
8. State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash. 2003).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10. See Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E. 2d 356, 369 (Mass. 2009) (holding that
"the police use of the defendant's minivan to conduct GPS monitoring . . . constituted a
seizure," which required a warrant, but declining to resolve the issue of whether GPS
monitoring is itself a search); People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (N.Y. 2009) (holding
that the "dragnet use of [GPS] at the sole discretion of law enforcement authorities to pry
into the details of people's daily lives is not consistent with the values at the core of Ithe
New York] State Constitution's prohibition against unreasonable searches"); Jackson, 76
P.3d at 224 (holding that the use of GPS devices on the vehicles of private citizens by law
enforcement constituted a search under the Washington Constitution).
11. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
12. Id. at 563.
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overhead, which never sleep, never blink, . . . and never lose atten-

tion."" Rather than await a decision from the Court, Congress is more
suited to resolve the issue through comprehensive legislation that
prohibits law enforcement from using a GPS device without first
procuring a warrant. Part II describes the Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment as it applies to evolving technology; in doing so, Part
II details the Court's transition from a trespass-based standard to a twopronged reasonableness test, focusing on the seminal Court decisions
that have shaped the debate over GPS technology today. Part III
provides a brief overview of modern GPS capabilities for law enforcement
and a discussion of the issues dividing the lower courts. Lastly, Part IV
explains the challenges facing the Court in providing adequate
protection from law enforcement's unrestricted use of GPS technology via
the Fourth Amendment and how Congress should, instead, step in to
protect this vital privacy interest.
II.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution14 protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures by government agents. 5
Prior to a Fourth Amendment analysis of reasonableness, the actions of
law enforcement must first be recognized as either a "search" or a
"seizure." 6 A search is defined as an invasion of an individual's
protected interest as measured by one's reasonable expectation of
privacy." Before the execution of a search, the second part of the
Fourth Amendment-the "Warrant Clause"-has been interpreted to
require a finding of probable cause in the presence of "a neutral and
detached magistrate."" Aside from a limited number of exceptions, if
a search is conducted without a warrant, it is considered "per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment."" For both federal and

13.

Pineda-Moreno,617 F.3d at 1126.

14.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

15. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
16. See Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470,476 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The
decision to characterize an action as a search is in essence a conclusion about whether the
[F]ourth [Almendment applies at all. If an activity is not a search or seizure (assuming the
activity does not violate some other constitutional or statutory provision), then the
government enjoys a virtual carte blanche to do as it pleases.").
17. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a "Search" Within the Meaning of the Fourth
Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 2 (2006).
18. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
19. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 566 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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state courts, the exclusionary rule mandates the suppression of illegally
seized evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment.20
From Physical Invasion to Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The test for whether police action demands the protection of the
Fourth Amendment was originally entrenched in the law of trespass.
For instance, in Olmstead v. United States,21 the Supreme Court
considered the Fourth Amendment's application to wire-tapping by the
government.22 Justice Taft noted that the Fourth Amendment's express
use of the language "houses, persons, papers, and effects" presumptively
Not only was
limited searches to those specific "material things."
that
concluded
Court
but
the
seized,
wire-tapping not a "thing" to be
home;
into
the
defendant's
there was no physical intrusion by the police
rather, "[tihe evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
and that only."2 1 Prophetically, Justice Brandeis, in dissent, forewarned that "[tihe progress of science in furnishing the government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping" and urged the
Court to view the Fourth Amendment not in "'what has been, but of
what may be.' 25 The result of the Court's decision in Olmstead was to
narrow the protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment to
physical invasions of a "constitutionally protected area.n2
2
radically altered the
In 1967 the Court, in Katz v. United States,"
expanse of the Fourth Amendment by declaring that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."" In Katz the Government
sought to introduce evidence of telephone conversations obtained when
the FBI attached an electronic listening and recording device outside of
a public telephone booth.2 9 The Court noted that even though the
telephone booth was public, one has a right to assume that the words
spoken in an enclosed booth would be free from intrusion from "the

A.

20. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); see also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 398 (1914).
21. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
22. Id. at 455.
23. Id. at 464-65.
24. Id. at 464.
25. Id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
26. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350, 352-53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
27. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
28. Id. at 351.
29. Id. at 348.
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uninvited ear."o In order to extend Fourth Amendment protections to
oral conversations obtained "without any technical trespass," the Court
overruled Olmstead to the extent that Olmstead relegated Fourth
Amendment rights to physical intrusions or the seizure of tangible
items." Thus, the Court held that by recording the petitioner's calls,
the FBI violated the privacy "upon which [the petitioner] justifiably
relied."32

The modern, "bright-line" rule for discerning whether a search has
occurred, however, is derived from Justice Harlan's concurrence in
Katz." Justice Harlan synthesized the majority's decision into a twopronged formula, requiring both an objective and subjective component.
First, Justice Harlan explained "that a person [must] have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy."5 From the
majority opinion, this subjective intent encompasses "what [one] seeks
to preserve as private."36 Second, notwithstanding a person's attempt
to conceal their actions, protection under the Fourth Amendment is only
guaranteed when "the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.' 3 7
In one of the first cases to apply the Katz test, United States v.
Caceres," the Court considered the issue of whether an IRS agent's
secret use of a recording device while questioning a defendant was
permissible under the Fourth Amendment.3 ' The Court concluded that
the recording was essentially the equivalent of the agent's contemporaneous written notes during the interview.40 Regardless, this information had already been conveyed to the agent in person." Therefore, the

30. Id. at 351-52 ("[Wlhat he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.... He did not shed his right to [privacy]
simply because he made his calls from a place where he might be seen.").
31. Id. at 353 (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. Id.
33. See Jonathan Simon, Katz at Forty:A SociologicalJurisprudenceWhose Time Has
Come, 41 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 935, 953 (2008) (noting that the Katz formula is "well-loved
by treatise writers and criminal procedure professors").
34. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 351 (majority opinion); see also United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 137
(2d Cir. 1980) (describing this prong of Katz as requiring that the defendant "acted in such
a way that it would have been reasonable for him to expect that he would not be
observed.").
37. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
38. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
39. Id. at 743.
40. Id. at 750-51.
41. Id. at 748.
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Court reasoned that because the conversation between the agent and the
defendant "without electronic equipment" did not violate the defendant's
reasonable expectation of privacy, neither did a "simultaneous recording"
of the same event.42
Similarly, in Smith v. Maryland,43 the Court sanctioned the government's warrantless use of a pen register," "a mechanical device that
records the numbers dialed on a telephone by monitoring the electric
impulses."a The pen register was limited to this use only; the pen
register did not disclose the communication between the caller and the
recipient.4 6 The Court explained that the information revealed by the
recording device was "merely the modern counterpart of the operator
who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber." 7
Because it is common knowledge that one relays the phone numbers he
dials to the phone provider, the Court held, yet again, that the police's
use of the pen register was not a search." These early applications of
the Katz rule indicate that despite the goal of the Court in Katz to
expand the breadth of protection under the Fourth Amendment, it often
came with a "heavy thumb on the scale of law enforcement."4
B. The Supreme Court's Application of the Katz Test to Racking
Devices
Two Supreme Court cases, United States v. Knottsso and United
States v. Karo," involving electronic surveillance in the form of
beepers, have set the stage for the current analysis regarding GPS
surveillance. 2 The battery operated beepers in both Knotts and Karo
emitted periodic signals at a set frequency that could be tracked by
police through a radio receiver as they trailed the vehicle." The

42.

Id. at 751.

43.
44.

442 U.S. 735 (1979).
Id. at 745-46.

45. Id. at 736 n.1 (quoting United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.1 (1977))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Id. at 741.
47.

Id. at 744.

48. Id. at 742.
49. Simon, supra note 33, at 953.
50.

460 U.S. 276 (1983).

51. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
52. CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, 2 WIRETAPPING & EAVESDROPPING:
SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 29:20 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that Knotts and Karo

"remain the benchmark in tracking device cases"), updated version available at Westlaw
WIRETAP.
53. Compare Karo, 468 U.S. at 707 n.1 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277), with Knotts,
460 U.S. at 277.
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beepers, which allowed police to locate a target within a two to four mile
radius, served to aid police in secretly following a suspect even after
losing visual contact.'
Sixteen years after the introduction of the Katz formula, the Court in
Knotts was faced with the question of whether the in-transit 5 tracking
of a vehicle via a beeper violated the defendant's reasonable expectation
of privacy.5 6 In Knotts a drug manufacturing company tipped the police
off that ex-employee, Tristan Armstrong, may have been stealing
chemicals for the production of a controlled substance. Thereafter,
agents got permission from a company where Armstrong had made
similar purchases to place a beeper inside of a five gallon drum of
chloroform, subsequently purchased by Armstrong. Agents kept contact
with Armstrong through visual surveillance accompanied by a monitoring device that received signals sent by the beeper. Police continued to
follow the beeper as the drum was transferred to Amstrong's coconspirator, Darryl Petschen, following Petschen from Minnesota to a
remote cabin in Shell Lake, Wisconsin. Once the drum came to its final
resting place, police secured a warrant based on evidence attained
through the combination of the beeper and their own visual surveillance;
the execution of the warrant revealed a drug laboratory used to produce
large quantities of amphetamines.5 7
In light of the Katz standard, the Court noted that vehicles are
traditionally subject to a "diminished expectation of privacy."
Determining that the use of a beeper was tantamount to the act of police
following an automobile on the street, the Court held that "[a] person
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another."
The Court reasoned that when Petschen drove with the drum in tow
"over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted
to look" the direction he traveled, the roads he took, and his final
stopping place.6 o Thus, by utilizing visual surveillance, police could
have discovered these same facts; the substitution of the beeper to

54. See Reply Brief for the United States, Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (No. 83-850), 1984 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 251, at *15 n.6; FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 52, § 29:3.
55. In-transit monitoring is defined as "{mlonitoring a tracking device from the time
and place it was installed into an object or vehicle until that object or vehicle has reached
its apparent, or at least its initial, destination." FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 52,
§ 29:4.
56. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278-79.
57. Id. at 278-79.
58. Id. at 281.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 281-82.
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monitor the presence of the vehicle made no difference in gaining
information theoretically ascertainable by means not constituting a
search.61
Although the Court recognized the respondent's argument that the
holding had the potential to lead to "twenty-four hour surveillance" of
any person without judicial review, the Court reserved this question for
a future date, stating that "if such dragnet type law enforcement
practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will be
time enough then to determine whether different constitutional
principles may be applicable. 6 2 Specifically, the Court emphasized the
"limited use" of the beeper and the fact that nothing was received nor
relied upon once the beeper indicated the drum had "ended its automotive journey" at the respondent's home. 3 The Court in Knotts likewise
was not persuaded by the fact that emerging technology would vastly
improve law enforcement's crime-fighting ability, stating, "We have
never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality, and we decline
to do so now."
A year later in Karo, the Court reaffirmed that using a beeper to
monitor a defendant on a public street was not a search." The Court,
however, faced with a slightly different version of the Knotts fact
pattern, modified its ruling when applied to circumstances invoking a
greater right to privacy.6 In Karo an informant allowed police to place
a beeper into a can of ether that police believed would later be used to
manufacture illegal drugs. Police subsequently tracked the can's
whereabouts as the can was transferred to several houses and eventually
to a storage facility.67 The wrinkle in Karo was that police used the
beeper in a manner such that information was revealed about an area
"that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance."
Unlike Knotts, in which the beeper was used merely to locate the drum
within the general vicinity of the cabin in rural Wisconsin,69 in Karo
the monitoring alerted authorities that the beeper was inside of the
suspect's house."o

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See id. at 282.
Id. at 283-84.
Id. at 284-85.
Id. at 284.
468 U.S. at 712-13.
Compare 460 U.S. 276, with Karo, 468 U.S. 705.
468 U.S. at 708-09.
Id. at 707 (emphasis added).
460 U.S. at 278-79.
468 U.S. at 715.
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In light of the general assumption that searches inside of homes are
presumptively unreasonable, the Court held the use of a beeper in this
manner, while less invasive than a full-scaled search, "reveal[ed] a
critical fact about the interior of the premises that the Government ...
could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant."n In response,
the Government contended that there would be no way of knowing prior
to attachment whether a beeper would transmit signals from a private
property; thus, police would be forced to seek a warrant every time they
used electronic surveillance.7 ' The Court rejected this argument,
noting that to prevent the type of abuse in question, agents were
required to secure a warrant when venturing into constitutionally
protected areas like the home. 7 ' The Court provided that the warrant
is "to describe the object into which the beeper is to be placed, the
circumstances that led agents to wish to install the beeper, and the
length of time for which beeper surveillance is requested."7 Thus, in
effect, the Court established the particularity requirements for investigators seeking a beeper warrant.
In regards to electronic surveillance, two basic principles can be
distilled from Knotts and Karo: (1) in-transit monitoring or monitoring
within a general location is not a search, while (2) the use of a beeper to
monitor a private location, such as a personal residence, would
constitute a search and must be supported by a warrant.7 ' Thus, as
hinted in Karo, this distinction sometimes causes investigators to engage
in "Fourth Amendment roulette."" Investigators can simply procure
a warrant beforehand for the use of a beeper for monitoring a suspect
both inside and outside of the home. Alternatively, investigators can
take a risk and not procure a warrant by only using in-transit and
general monitoring concomitantly with visual surveillance, but they
must avoid tracking the device into areas where there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy recognized by the Court.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 717.
Id. at 718.
Id.
See FIsHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 52,
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

§ 29:19.

1252

[Vol. 62

MERCER LAW REVIEW

C. The Confirmation of a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the
Home
Similar to the exception carved out in United States v. Karo,"
prohibiting the use of beepers to discern information beyond visual
surveillance, the Supreme Court most recently in Kyllo v. United
States," underscored the importance of a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the home. In Kyllo agents used a thermal imaging device on
the front and back of the defendant's home. The thermal imaging device
in question detected infrared radiation and converted the radiation into
images based on relative warmth.' The imager itself did not penetrate
the home, but rather "passively measure[d] heat emitted from the
exterior surfaces."" As the agents suspected, Kyllo was using halide
lights to grow marijuana; the imager depicted the garage and side wall
of the defendant's home as relatively warm compared to the rest of the
house." Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, acknowledged that
this was more than naked-eye surveillance and couched the question as
"how much technological enhancement of ordinary perception from such
a vantage point, [like the street], is too much."' The Court reiterated
a point that has been firmly established in common law: "[Tihe Fourth
Amendment draws 'a firm line at the entrance to the house.'"" Thus,
the Court held that the use of sense-enhancing technology, at least that
"not in general public use," constitutes a search when the technology is
used to glean information regarding the interior of a home that could not
otherwise be determined without intruding onto this constitutionally
protected area.8
Although the technology utilized in Kyllo was "relatively crude," the
Court was cautious to "take [into] account ...

more sophisticated

systems that are already in use or in development" and have the
capability of viewing activities inside of the home with more precision.86
Despite the Court's emphasis on the sanctity of the home, Kyllo should
not be interpreted to support an assertion that "technologically-enhanced
surveillance is, no matter what, outside Fourth Amendment constraints
78. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
79. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
80.
81.

Id. at 29-30.
Id. at 42-43; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FouRTH AMENDMENT § 2.2(e) (4th ed. 2004 & Supp. 2010-2011).

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 30.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
Id.
Id. at 36.
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when directed at activity occurring outside the home."' Rather, Kyllo
directly resolved the issue presented and in doing so, reaffirmed that
one, invariably, has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home."
III.

FROM BEEPERS To GPS SURVEILLANCE: QUESTIONS LEFT
UNRESOLVED BY KATz, KNoTs, & KARo

The reasonable expectation test of United States v. Katz," coupled
with its application to beepers in United States v. Knottso and United
States v. Karo,9 1 has created difficult questions for the lower courts to
consider when faced with whether an inherently different technological
tool-GPS-affects one's reasonable expectation of privacy. GPS is defined
as a "space-based radio-positioning system," consisting of at least
twenty-four earth-orbiting satellites at any given time." Through the
mathematical process known as trilateration, a GPS receiver on Earth
determines its location based on the location and distances between four
or more satellites." By using trilateration three-dimensionally, the
receiver can calculate its coordinate location and altitude; the receiver
also computes its speed and direction based on the rate of change in the
information received from the satellites.94
To be used as a tracking device, GPS receivers are equipped with
transmitters that allow a third party to gain information from a remote
location." When GPS devices are used to track defendants, the devices
may be employed either passively-to monitor a person's locations after

87. LAFAVE, supra note 81, § 2.2(e) (conceding that the Court on prior occasions may
have leaned toward characterizing technologically-enhanced surveillance outside the home
as beyond the reach of the Fourth Amendment).
88. See 533 U.S. at 40.
89. 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
90. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
91. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
92. U.S. Air ForceFact Sheet: Global PositioningSystems Directorate,L.A. AIR FORCE
BASE (Jan. 7, 2011), http-//www.losangeles.af.milibrary/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=5311.
93. Marshall Brain & Tom Harris, How GPS Receivers Work, HowSTuFFWORKS,
http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/gadgets/travel/gps.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
94. Ren6e McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 417 (2007).
95. Id. at 418; see also State v. Holden, No. 1002012520, 2010 WL 5140744, at *2 (Del.
Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2010). In Holden the court stated that
GPS vehicular tracking systems consist of three components: (i) a receiver on
the target vehicle which calculates the vehicle's location through the use of
satellites; (ii) a cellular telephone or other technology which transmits the
vehicle's position; and (iii) a computer monitoring device which receives and stores
location information and uses mapping software to display the vehicle's location.
2010 WL 5140744, at *2.
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the fact-or actively-to track a suspect's real-time movements.96 Unlike
the use of the beeper, GPS allows a person's movements to "be charted
and recorded over lengthy periods possibly limited only by the need to
change the transmitting unit's batteries."" GPS devices also provide
twenty-four hour coverage that is undeterred by severe weather
conditions."
A simplistic interpretation of Knotts and Karo would provide the most
expedient answer to the advent of GPS-enabled tracking, but such an
analysis neglects consideration of the massive quantity of information
GPS surveillance can obtain over time and the inferences that can be
drawn about a person's private and personal life." Thus, lower courts
have struggled to shape a rule that accounts for Supreme Court
precedent concerning other tracking devices-like beepers-with modern
GPS devices that permit the secret observation of a person's activities
over an extended period of time. Given the capabilities of GPS
technology, two questions are especially pressing for the lower courts: (1)
whether, by driving a vehicle with a covertly installed GPS device, one
exposes such actions to the public, and (2) whether the current use of
GPS technology has reached the dragnet-level of twenty-four hour
surveillance left open by the Supreme Court.100
A.

Public Exposure
Generally, the Supreme Court has held that a person assumes the risk
of discovery when they expose their actions to the public, thus diminishing any reasonable expectation of privacy.10 1 As Justice Stewart
proclaimed in Katz, "What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment

96. FISHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 52, § 29:35.
97. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009).
98. Richard B. Langley, In Simple Terms, How Does GPS Work?, GEODESY &
GEOMATIcs ENG'G UNIV. OF NEW BRUNSWICK, http//gge.unb.ca/Resources/HowDoesGPSWo-

rk.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2008).
99. See Hutchins, supra note 94, at 457 (arguing that "the appropriate constitutional
treatment of GPS-enhanced surveillance is not tied up in Knotts because, as a factual
matter, beeper and GPS technology are fundamentally different in terms of the quantity
of information revealed by the science").
100. See Arthur G. LeFrancois, Global PositioningSystem Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 6 ABA ScI. TECH. L. 18, 19 (2009).
101. See THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EvoLuTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 233 (2009);
see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (alteration in
original) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351) ("Whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable
depends in large part upon whether that expectation relates to information that has been
'exposeldi to the public.'").
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protection.""o2 Therefore, police need not turn a blind eye to criminal
activity that could have been seen by any member of the public.10
With respect to the use of GPS surveillance, two rules have developed.
The majority approach provides that one traveling in a vehicle on public
roads, even with a covertly installed GPS, voluntarily exposes their
actions to the public domain and therefore has no reasonable expectation
of privacy.10 ' Conversely, the "aggregate" or "mosaic" approach asserts
that the probability of accumulating the totality of an individual's
movements in the public without the assistance of a GPS is so small that
the data collected from the GPS cannot actually be considered exposed
to the public."o0

The majority test derives its analysis from a direct application of
Knotts and Karo: law enforcement's use of electronic surveillance,
including GPS, does not trigger a reasonable expectation of privacy, at
least not while traversing on public roads.10 The Court in Knotts
demoted vehicles to a lower standard of privacy due to their "function [as
a form ofi transportation [that] seldom serves as one's residence or as
the repository of personal effects."o' Therefore, the oft-quoted phrase
in Knotts that "[a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy" provides the obvious
analogy that a person traveling in a vehicle equipped with a GPS
similarly "voluntarily convey[s]" that person's whereabouts to others
while traveling from point A to point B.10 s A recent district court case
displays this application of Knotts to GPS surveillance:
It is difficult for the court to see how the reasoning in Knotts is not
directly on point. When Defendant drove his car from place to place he
voluntarily let it be known to anyone who wanted to follow him the fact
that he was driving on certain roads at particular times and that he

102. 389 U.S. at 351.
103. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) ("[Tlhe police cannot
reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could
have been observed by any member of the public."); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213
(1986) ("[T]he mere fact that an individual has taken measures to restrict some views of
his activities [does not] preclude an officer's observations from a public vantage point where
he has a right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible.").
104. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007) ("The Supreme Court has held
that the mere tracking of a vehicle on public streets by means of a similar though less
sophisticated device (a beeper) is not a search.").
105. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560.
106. Karo, 468 U.S. at 713; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
107. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
108. Id.
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made stops along the way. Anyone who followed Defendantcould have
timed how long it took him to arrive at his destinations, how long he
stayed there, and the nature of the places that he visited, i.e., church,
casinos, strip clubs, etc.'0o
Thus, so long as the monitoring did not enter the private residence,
several courts have held that the use of a tracking device while
monitoring a vehicle on a public street is not a search.1 o
The cases that follow the reasoning of Knotts rationalize that the
police, theoretically, could have obtained the same information collected
by a GPS device through visual surveillance."1 ' Because visual
surveillance, though a more expensive and arduous method than GPS
tracking, 11 2 "would have sufficed to reveal all of these facts to the
police," it follows that the use of devices like beepers and GPS units do
not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy."' This point is
illustrated in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
case, United States v. Garcia,"' in which agents discovered the
defendant's methamphetamine production through "a GPS . . . 'memory
tracking unit"' attached to his girlfriend's vehicle."' The pocket-sized
GPS device stored the vehicle's location history, and when police later
retrieved the device they learned the defendant had frequented a large

109. United States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-CR-00017-01, 2010 WL 2991229, at * 3
(M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010).
110. See, e.g., Pineda-Moreno,591 F.3d at 1217; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997; Jesus-Nunez,
2010 WL 2991229, at *4.
111. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 ("The governmental surveillance conducted by means of
the beeper in this case amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public
streets and highways."); United States v. Moran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 425,467 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
In Moran the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York stated,
The GPS device tracked the whereabouts of Moran's vehicle on July 29 and 30,
2003, upon his return from a one-day trip to Arizona. Law enforcement personnel
could have conducted a visual surveillance of the vehicle as it traveled on the
public highways. Moran had no expectation of privacy in the whereabouts of his
vehicle on a public roadway. Thus, there was no search or seizure and no Fourth
Amendment implications in the use of the GPS device.
349 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (citation omitted).
112. United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 393 (D. Mass. 2010) (footnote
omitted) ("Warrantless visual surveillance or 'tailing' of Sparks unquestionably would have
been permissible and would have revealed to the FBI all of the same details the GPS
device provided, only at a much higher cost, and possibly at a higher risk to law
enforcement officers.").
113. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
114. 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
115. Id. at 995.
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plot of land where materials used to produce methamphetamine were
discovered.116
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit, reasoned that tracking
through a GPS device was no different from such non-search tactics, like
following a car, observing the car's route via camera, or using satellite
While acknowledging that the
imaging such as Google Earth."'
Fourth Amendment' must "keep pace with the march of science,"
Judge Posner distinguished the Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo, in
which the Court held that the use of a thermal imager violated a
reasonable expectation of privacy, because Kyllo was inapposite to the
facts before him."' Judge Posner opined that the technology in Kyllo
was used as a substitute for a form of police investigation-physical entry
According to Judge
into the home-that is unequivocally a search.'
Posner, the use of GPS technology to track a defendant's location over
time, however, is a "substitute ... for an activity, namely following a car
on a public street, that is unequivocally not a search within the meaning
of the amendment." 2 ' Thus, although police cannot "sidestep the
warrant requirement" with advanced technology that intrudes into a
constitutionally protected area like the home, using technology to replace
a police method where no warrant is required does not elevate such
police activity to a search.12 2
Moreover, the Court has consistently held that the Fourth Amendment
does not preclude law enforcement's use of modern technological
advances that serve to augment the senses.' 2 3 Thus, the Court has
validated the use of flashlights, binoculars, field glasses, and cameras
with telescopic -lenses in the detection of a crime, so long as law
enforcement is using these tools from a lawful vantage point.'2
Moreover, high-tech items like "radios, street cameras, radar, helicopters,
computers, . . . and microscopes" are staples of law enforcement utilized
everyday in furtherance of their policing duties.'2 5 Similarly, the
Court has classified beepers as sense-augmenting because their use

116. Id.
117. Id. at 997.
118. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
119. Garcia,474 F.3d at 997.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94.
123. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282 ("Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the
police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.").
124. Clancy, supra note 17, at 23-24; see also LAFAVE, supra note 81, at 477.
125. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 394.

1258

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

necessitates the close proximity of law enforcement and aids in
maintaining visual surveillance of a target on public roads.12 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Pineda-Morenol'" rested its holding on the same premise. In
Pineda-Moreno, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents
monitored Pineda-Moreno over a four-month period using various
mobile-tracking devices attached to his Jeep Cherokee after he was seen
at Home Depot purchasing fertilizer typically used to grow marijuana.
When the device alerted agents to a suspected marijuana site, they were
able to tie the evidence together to indict Pineda-Moreno of conspiracy
to manufacture marijuana.'2 8 Quoting Knotts, the Ninth Circuit held
"[ilnsofar as [Pineda-Moreno's] complaint appears to be simply that
scientific devices such as the [tracking devices] enabled the police to be
more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional
foundation."' 29 Thus, the public exposure test has generally meant
that conduct taking place in public, even if requiring advanced police
technology to amplify police senses in detecting such an act, is fair game
for police discovery.'
In contrast, the minority approach defines public exposure, not in
theory, but as "the actual likelihood[] of discovery by a stranger.""'
2
The D.C. Circuit in United States v. Maynard"3
was the first court to
clearly articulate this standard and its application to GPS surveillance.
In Maynard the police used a GPS device to track defendant Antoine
Jones for twenty-eight consecutive days (a warrant was secured but not
executed within the ten day limit) while pursuing an alleged drug
conspiracy."13 To avoid the harsh results of Knotts, the D.C. Circuit
formulated a standard based on several Supreme Court cases in which
the Court, although finding the activity at issue to be exposed to the

126. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
127. 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010).
128. Id. at 1213-14.
129. Id. at 1216 (second and third alteration in original) (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at
284); see also Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998 ("Of course the [Fourth] [Almendment cannot
sensibly be read to mean that police shall be no more efficient in the twenty-first century
than they were in the eighteenth.").
130. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82.
131. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 560.
132. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
133. See id. at 559-60. The probability-based standard has been hinted at by several
state supreme courts. See, e.g., Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199 ("The potential for a similar
capture of information or 'seeing' by law enforcement would require, at a minimum,
millions of additional police officers and cameras on every street lamp."); State v. Jackson,
76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003).
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public, implicated that exposure hinged on the odds of detection by
members of the general public.134
One of the Supreme Court cases highlighted by the D.C. Circuit in
Maynard is California v. Ciraolo," in which police officers, acting on
a tip that the defendant was growing marijuana, flew over the defendant's backyard at 1000 feet and took aerial photographs of the
marijuana fields (officers resorted to this method as a result of a ten-foot
fence precluding entry into the backyard).136 The Court posited that
the observations made by police did not constitute a search because they
were made in "public navigable airspace" where "[any member of the
public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have" viewed what
the officers observed."' This analysis alone would seem to support the
Court's approach that what is lawfully attainable on a public street is
not a search. It is what the Court said next, however, that gave context
to the decision; the Court reasoned that "fiun an age where private and
commercial flight in the public airways is routine," it is unreasonable to
expect privacy from naked eye observations of police flying above.'
Thus, the crux of the decision, at least according the D.C. Circuit, is the
commonality of such flights having full access to view the ground below,
which reduces one's reasonable expectation of privacy.'
The Supreme Court similarly suggested this probability-based test in
Floridav. Riley,14 o in which the Court held that police use of a helicopter at a height of 400 feet to view a defendant's greenhouse did not
constitute a search.' 4 1 Like in Ciarolo, the plurality decision rested "in
large measure, on the frequency of nonpolice helicopter flights at an
altitude of 400 feet." 14 2 In addition, Justice O'Connor conjectured that
"[ilf the public rarely, if ever, travels" at such an altitude, then the use

134. See, e.g., Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559-60.
135. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
136. Id. at 209-10.
137. Id. at 213-14.
138. Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
139. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559. The court in Maynard quoted Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Floridav. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 453 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring),
in which she explained the holding in Ciraolo, stating that
Ciraolo's expectation of privacy was unreasonable not because the airplane was
operating where it had a "right to be," but because public air travel at 1,000 feet
is a sufficiently routine part of modem life that it is unreasonable for persons on
the ground to expect that their curtilage will not be observed from the air at that
altitude.
Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559 (quoting Riley, 488 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
140. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
141. Id. at 448, 450.
142. Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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of the helicopter by police at such a vantage point would not be
knowingly exposed to the public sphere."' Even more recently, the
Court in Kyllo acknowledged a potential caveat to the rule that the use
of a thermal imaging device into the home constitutes a search when the
technology in question is already in "general public use."1"
Based on these cases, the D.C. Circuit in Maynard deduced that when
the actual or mathematical likelihood that a stranger would discover an
individual's action is high (such that the individual can reasonably
expect another to view it) then an observation by law enforcement is not
a search.14 5 Inversely, when the likelihood is low, then a search has
occurred. 4 6 The court in Maynard conceded that a theoretical observer could have watched an individual like Jones while he drove his
vehicle at any given time."' The court reasoned, however, that "the
whole of a person's movements over the course of a month [revealed
through prolonged use of a GPS device] is not actually exposed to the
public because the likelihood a stranger would observe all those
Thus, unlike
movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil."'
Ciraolo or Riley, in which a casual observer could (and had the
opportunity to) view the totality of the defendant's illegal activities, one
would not expect even a stealthy observer to attain a detailed log of an
individual's private routine as attained through GPS surveillance. 9
The court in Maynard additionally raised, sua sponte, the question of
whether the extended use of GPS surveillance to track defendants means
their actions are constructively exposed to the public. ' The court
acknowledged the plausible argument that each individual trip that the
defendant made was in public view but asserted that "the whole," or the
collection of one's repeated activities and interests ascertained through
the use of GPS, "may be more revealing than the parts."' The court
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in United States
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the
52 which arose under an interpretation of the Freedom of
Press,1

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
during
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 455 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559-60.
See id.
Id. at 560 ("It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow someone
a single journey as he goes to the market or returns home from work.").
Id.
Id.
Id. at 560-61.
Id. at 561.
489 U.S. 749 (1989).
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Information Act,"'a not the Fourth Amendment.I"
In Reporters
Committee, the Court refused to grant a request for rap sheets disclosing
criminal records of certain individuals, even though technically the
"individual events in those summaries [were] matters of public record";
the Court reasoned that a person's privacy interest in the rap sheet as
a whole is a distinct interest with a greater need for privacy than the
"scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap
sheet.""' Thus, in Maynard the D.C. Circuit concluded that GPS
surveillance on public streets over an extensive period "is not constructively exposed to the public because, like a rap sheet," GPS surveillance
gives insight into a person's "habits and patterns," in which a higher
degree of privacy is expected.156
Through this crafty "mosaic" formulation, the court in Maynard
capitalized on the fear that if GPS-enabled tracking is not a search, then
all individuals will be at risk of government invasion into their day-today routines."5
Unlike short-term surveillance, prolonged GPS
surveillance allows law enforcement to perceive intimate details about
an individual's personal life such as "whether he is a weekly church
goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, [or]
an associate of particular individuals or political groups."5' The court
in Maynard asserted that this information is much more telling about
a person's private affairs than a single trip viewed in isolation.15
Notwithstanding the fact that each drive is technically exposed to the
public domain, reasonable people do not expect when getting into their
cars that the government will track with precision and accuracy their
locations, their routes, and how long they remain at each location.'
B.

Mass Surveillance v. ProlongedSurveillance
One of the most controversial passages cited by both proponents and
opponents of the expansion of Fourth Amendment protection to GPS
technology is Justice Rehnquist's acknowledgement in Knotts that,
should technological advances arise to the level of a "twenty-four hour
surveillance," the Supreme Court would re-consider "whether different

153. Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552
(2006 & Supp. 2008)).
154. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561; see also Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 751.
155. 489 U.S. at 753, 764.
156. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561-62.
157. See Hutchins, supra note 94, at 459; see also Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
158. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 563.
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constitutional principles may be applicable.""6 ' In Knotts the Court
was addressing the respondent's prediction that future technology could
foreseeably lead to any citizen being monitored for a significant period
of time "without judicial knowledge or supervision." 6 2 It may be
dictum, but this statement has provided an opening for revisiting the
Fourth Amendment with respect to GPS technology. The question
becomes as follows: Does GPS technology make twenty-four hour
surveillance a reality?
Two schools of thought exist as to the twenty-four hour surveillance
inquiry. The first group postulates that the Court's response in Knotts
is aimed at the prolonged use of the technological device, even if simply
tracking a single individual.' Alternatively, the second group argues
that the Court sought to address the widespread surveillance of multiple
people, not a single defendant.1 64 Both the Seventh Circuit in Garcia
and the Ninth Circuit in Pineda-Morenoagree with the latter view-that
this "wholesale surveillance" has not yet been achieved in cases
involving law enforcement's use of GPS to track a sole defendant
engaged in the commission of a crime.165 Neither court, however,
foreclosed this possibility in the future if the technology was used to
encompass a large number of unassuming persons.6 6 Judge Posner,

161. 460 U.S. at 283-84 (internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. at 283. In the respondent's brief, attorney Mark W. Peterson apparently
argued that without a warrant, law enforcement could use a beeper on anyone without
their knowledge without evidence to substantiate such a search. Brief of Respondent,
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (No. 81-1802), 1982 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 124, at *17-18. Peterson
stated,
Without the limitations imposed by the warrant requirement itself, and the terms
of any warrant which is issued, any person or residence could be monitored at any
time and for any length of time.... [It would enable authorities to determine a
citizen's location at any time without knowing whether his travels are for
legitimate or illegitimate purposes . . . . A beeper thus would turn a person into
a broadcaster of his own affairs and travels, without his knowledge or consent, for
as long as the government may wish to use him where no warrant places a limit
on surveillance.
Id.
163. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556; see also Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199.
164. See Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997-98; Tarik N. Jallad, Old Answers to New Questions:
GPS Surveillance and the UnwarrantedNeed for Warrants,11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 351,37173 (2010) (arguing that "there is no evidence that any of this 'abuse' has occurred, as each
case has involved surveillance of 'an individual suspect, not dragnet-type or mass surveillance'").
165. Compare Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216-17, with Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998.
166. Compare Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 n.2, with Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998
("Should government someday decide to institute programs of mass surveillance of
vehicular movements, it will be time enough to decide whether the Fourth Amendment
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writing for the Seventh Circuit in Garcia, acquiesced that GPS
technology has the potential to create wholesale surveillance if police use
tactics such as placing GPS devices on vehicles at random or by
requiring through legislation that all new vehicles come equipped with
a GPS device for the purpose of police detection."' Judge Posner
reasoned, however, that the Fourth Amendment cannot be read to limit
advancements in police efficiency, and it is prudent when confronted
with a tradeoff between security and privacy to err on the side of
security.'
The Seventh Circuit, however, stopped short of saying that
just because installing GPS devices in all vehicles "would merely be an
efficient alternative to hiring another 10 million police officers to tail
every vehicle" such a wide-spread use of technology would not constitute
a search.'"'
The courts that hold that law enforcement's targeted use of GPS
devices does not arise to "dragnet" levels rationalize that in most cases
the use of a GPS to track an individual defendant "hardly suggests
abuse."7 o Although a holding in favor of the warrantless placement
of a GPS device on a defendant's vehicle obviates the need for probable
cause or even a reasonable suspicion to track an individual defendant,
some courts feel compelled to demonstrate its existence regardless."'
Judge Posner noted that the police of Polk County, Wisconsin, only
utilized GPS technology "when they have a suspect in their sights," and
that in Garcia the police had sufficient evidence to support their
suspicion that the defendant was manufacturing methamphetamine.172
Presenting evidence of probable cause seems to undermine Judge
Posner's position because the police could have easily obtained a
warrant.
On the other hand, some courts have construed the idea of twenty-four
hour surveillance to refer to a protracted surveillance of a single
The Supreme Court in Knotts suggested such an interindividual.'
pretation by emphasizing the fact that the Government in that case
made only minimal use of the beeper and neither received nor relied

should be interpreted to treat such surveillance as a search.").
167. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283 (internal quotation marks omitted).
171. See Seventh CircuitHolds that GPs Tracking Is Not a Search, 120 HARV. L. REV.
2230, 2237 (2007) (noting that "[although [the police in Garcia] had gathered ample
evidence to justify their suspicion before installing the GPS device, current doctrine does
not require the state to be so scrupulous").
172. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998.
173. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558.
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upon signals from the beeper after the drum "had ended its automotive
journey."" 4 The D.C. Circuit in Maynard asserted that the distinction
between the information gathered from a "discrete journey" in Knotts
and the "more comprehensive or sustained [GPSI monitoring" evidenced
in Maynard prompted a different standard, one which the Supreme
Court chose to purposefully resolve at a later time.' Such an analysis adds flexibility to the typically rigid application of Knotts, because
under the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit, a person is only precluded from
asserting a reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements "from
one place to another" and not in the "world without end."' 6
Likewise, some courts have emphasized the implausibility of the police
"successfully maintain[ing] uninterrupted 24-hour surveillance" for days
or weeks on end without the assistance of a GPS."' In People v.
Weaver,"' the Court of Appeals of New York pointed out that in Knotts
officers were engaged in actively tailing the vehicle and simply used the
beeper to maintain visual contact with the suspect.'79 The court
distinguished "the single trip" in Knotts with the extended use of a GPS
unit for sixty-five days in Weaver, which allowed the investigators to
save the tracking history of the defendant's van and eventually link him
to a recent burglary based on his location and the speed of the car at the
time of the crime.so The court concluded that a GPS device does not
simply facilitate the police in conducting visual surveillance but allows
an unlimited accumulation of information over an extended period of
time.'8" Capturing the same information by police would "require, at
a minimum, millions of additional police officers and cameras on every
street lamp."182

Similarly, Judge Kozinski, in his dissent to the Ninth Circuit's denial
of a re-hearing en banc in United States v. Pineda-Moreno,'8e conjectured that the coupling of GPS satellites and cell phone towers has
arisen to the level of "dragnet-type law enforcement practices."" He
passionately argued that "the all-seeing network of GPS satellites"

174. 460 U.S. at 284-85.
175. 615 F.3d at 556.
176. Id. at 557.
177. Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223.
178. 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009).
179. Id. at 1199.
180. Id. at 1196, 1199.
181. Id. at 1199.
182. Id.
183. 617 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).
184. Id. at 1126 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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combined with the "dense network of cell towers that honeycomb the
inhabited United States . . . can provide law enforcement with a swift,
efficient, silent, invisible and cheap way of tracking the movements of
virtually anyone and everyone they choose.""' In doing so, Judge
Kozinksi addressed the need for expediency in resolving whether GPS
surveillance constitutes a search as its capabilities are becoming more
relevant across several domains, including cell phones," 90% of which
are equipped with built-in GPS technology accurate to within fifty
feet. 87
IV.

AMELIORATING FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSTRAINTS IN ADAPTING
TO GPS TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LEGISLATION

This Author believes that Congress should step in to create a workable
standard with regard to GPS technology, firmly establishing that the use
of GPS surveillance must be predicated on a warrant. Based on the
current Supreme Court precedent of United States v. Knotts'8 and
United States v. Karo,1' even the determination of whether to attain
a "beeper warrant" in light of possible monitoring inside of a home can
be problematic;190 adding the prohibition against GPS devices through
the courts, rather than a straight-forward rule through the legislature,
may create even more uncertainty.
Currently, federal legislation provides minimal guidance for the use
of electronic tracking devices, including beepers and GPS devices. The
"Tracking Device Statute"'9 ' defines a "tracking device" as "an electronic or mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement
of a person or object."' The statute is broadly worded, encompassing
beepers, GPS devices, and even cell phones.193 The statute, however,

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Kevin McLaughlin, Note, The Fourth Amendment and Cell Phone Location
Tracking: Where are We?, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 421, 427 (2007).
188. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
189. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
190.

See U.S. DEP'T OF JusTIcE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL: PROCEDURES AND

CASE LAw FORMS 48 (2005), availableat http://www.justice.gov/criminal/foia/docselec-surmanual.pdf The United States Department of Justice's Electronic Surveillance Manual
suggests that a search warrant, although not required, should be secured in the case of
"'bumper beepers' . . . (slince it often cannot be determined in advance whether a package
containing a beeper will be taken inside a place where a person has a valid expectation of
privacy." Id.
191. 18 U.S.C § 3117(b) (2006).
192. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. FIsHMAN & McKENNA, supra note 52, § 29:3.
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has no practical value in answering the questions posed by GPS
surveillance but simply allows a federal court to authorize a warrant
providing for the extra-jurisdictional use of the device.194 Thus, a
judge is permitted to grant the use, though not installation, of a tracking
device outside his jurisdiction, but the statute neither requires a warrant
for such use nor specifies the appropriate standard of proof.19
Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure1 6 was
amended in 2006 to address the procedures for the installation and use
of tracking devices via Rule 41.1'" In the comments to the rule, the
Advisory Committee cautioned that Rule 41 does not "hold that such
warrants may issue only on a showing of probable cause."'
Rather,
Rule 41 merely provides that if probable cause is demonstrated, then
"the magistrate judge must issue the warrant."' Thus, Rule 41 does
not limit the issuance of a warrant to a showing of probable cause; a
magistrate judge could approve a warrant for a tracking device based on
the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion, requiring merely a showing
of clear and articulable facts.200 If a magistrate judge issues a warrant
for a tracking device, Rule 41 states that the warrant must include a
description of the person or thing to be tracked and designate a
reasonable length of time the device is to be used.20' Rule 41 further
provides that the warrant must be executed within ten days, and that
the warrant lasts up to forty-five days.202 The main issue with Rule
41, however, is that it does not require law enforcement to secure a
warrant as a condition precedent to using a tracking device like GPS
surveillance.
While Congress has left the substantive issues of when a warrant is
required as well as the proper standard of proof to the courts, this

194. 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2006) ("If a court is empowered to issue a warrant or other
order for the installation of a mobile tracking device, such order may authorize the use of
that device within the jurisdiction of the court, and outside that jurisdiction if the device
is installed in that jurisdiction.").
195. United States v. Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 757-58 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted) (noting that while the Tracking Device Statute "provides a basis for authorizing
the use of a mobile tracking device[,] section 3117 does not prohibit the use of a tracking
device in the absence of conformity with the section. Nor does it bar the use of evidence
acquired without a section 3117 order").
196. FED. R. CRIM. P.
197. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2XC).
198. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 2006 advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
199. Id.
200. See Sarah Rahter, Note, Privacy Implicationsof GPS Tracking Technology, 4 J.L.
& POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 755, 758-59 (2008).
201. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (eX2XC).
202. Id.
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Author opines that the appropriate solution to protect this important
privacy right should not be in limbo until a future determination by the
Supreme Court. Certainly, the divergence in interpretation warrants
Court review. Three important considerations should be noted, however,
in relying on the Court to grant certiorari to this issue, let alone rule in
favor of construing the Fourth Amendment203 as protecting citizens
from the secret use of GPS surveillance. First, the government-favored
reasonable expectation of privacy rule first enunciated in United States
v. Katz204 lends too much reliance on arbitrary decision-making by the
Court. Second, the Court has recently expressed hesitation in ruling on
society's reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to emerging
technology that could impede a decision on the matter. Third, the Court
would be forced to construct a narrow holding to prevent extrapolation
to police activities that were traditionally thought to be non-searches.
Given the Fourth Amendment's deficiencies in coping with GPS
technology, this Author asserts that a Congressional undertaking is
required to protect this individual privacy interest.
The Erosion of the Katz Rule
The first reason that decisions concerning GPS-enabled technology
should be allocated to Congress is the underlying paradigm for what
constitutes a search-the two-pronged Katz rule-which has been critiqued
by scholars and Supreme Court Justices alike. Most of the criticism is
geared toward the second prong, which considers whether the privacy
2 05
interest is "one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."'
The Justices have not only disagreed about the circumstances under
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy but also the

A.

efficacy of the test itself, calling it "circular . . . and unpredictable."'

It has been noted that by defining a search in terms of actions that
violate one's "reasonable expectation of privacy," the Court has held that
several investigative acts, including looking through someone's garbage,
trespassing on non-curtilage areas, flying airplanes and helicopters over

203. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
204. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
205. Id. at 361. The Court has implicated that less weight is placed on an individual's
subjective expectation of privacy than society's recognition of the expectation because of the
difficulty of application of the subjective test and the significance of examining the
consequences of privacy rights on society. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 n.7
(1984).
206. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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a person's yard, or going undercover, do not warrant Fourth Amendment
protection.0 o
Fourth Amendment scholar Orin Kerr posits that the reasonable
expectation of privacy test is simply "a legal fiction that masks a
normative inquiry into whether a particular law enforcement technique
should be regulated by the Fourth Amendment." 20"
Thus, Kerr
surmises, if the Court subjectively believes that a particular method
should be regulated, the police action is cast as a violation of a
defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy.209 Kerr also contends
that with the variety of facts presented in Fourth Amendment cases, it
is too difficult for the Court to accurately distinguish which police acts
are sufficiently troublesome and which are not.210
Although the Court has seemingly applied the Katz test, Justice Scalia
has expressed a similar sentiment towards the Katz rule. In Minnesota
v. Carter,"' Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, argued that the
text of the Fourth Amendment does not support the Katz test:
When [this] self-indulgent test is employed .. . to determine whether
a "search or seizure" within the meaning of the Constitution has
occurred (as opposed to whether that "search or seizure" is an
"unreasonable" one), it has no plausible foundation in the text of the
[The Fourth Amendment] enumerate[s]
Fourth Amendment....
("persons, houses, papers, and effects") the objects of privacy protection
to which the Constitution would extend, leaving further expansion to
the good judgment, not of this Court, but of the people through their
representatives in the legislature.212
Justice Scalia's description of the Katz two-part test as self-indulgent
belies his later use of the test in Kyllo, in which the test was invoked to
hold that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy to be free from
thermal energy technology to detect heat emitting from the home.213
Nevertheless, his statement demonstrates that too much emphasis is

207. Christopher Slobogin & Joesph E. Schumacher, ReasonableExpectationsofPrivacy
and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at "Understandings
Recognized and Permitted by Society," 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 729 (1993) (internal quotation
marks omitted).

208. Orin S. Kerr,Applying the FourthAmendment to the Internet:A GeneralApproach,
62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1037 (2010).
209. Id. at 1037-38.

210. Orin Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503,
506 (2007).
211. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
212. Id. at 97-98 (Scalia, J., concurring).
213. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
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placed on the Justices' arbitrary decision-making regarding what society
believes is reasonable.
The public, or at least the public media, has a clear opinion on the
issue.2 14 Accordingly, United States v. Maynard21 has shed light on
this nation-wide societal understanding of a right to be free from the
unfettered use of GPS surveillance, noting that several states have made
it unlawful for persons other than the police to use electronic surveillance to track someone without their knowledge.2 " As Judge Kozinski
declared, "There is something creepy and un-American about such
clandestine and underhanded behavior," as when investigators go onto
a person's driveway and under their car to implant "a device that will
track the vehicle's every movement and transmit that information to
total strangers."2 17 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is not always
aligned with society's true expectations of privacy.218 Congress,
however, has the ability to proceed proactively in response to public
opinion by creating rules ex ante or "generalized rules for the future,"
rather than a Fourth Amendment decision tailored only to a specific set
of facts. 21 9 Thus, it would be prudent to lobby Congress for a change
in the law, rather than await an uncertain, possibly more restrictive,
resolution from the Court.
The Supreme Court's Cautious Approach to New Technology
The Supreme Court may also be less inclined to rule on the use of GPS
technology because of the Court's hesitancy in recent years to lay down
broad rules with respect to emerging technology.220 In Kyllo the rapid
expanse of police technology was used to justify the Court's decision that
thermal imaging technology, although not penetrating inside of the
house, "would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technoloB.

214. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, The Government Can Use GPS to Track Your Moves, TIME
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2013150,00.html (calling
it "bizarre" and "scary" that "lglovernment agents can sneak onto your property in the
middle of the night, put a GPS device on the bottom of your car and keep track of
everywhere you go").
215. 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
216. Id. at 564.
217. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski,
J., dissenting).
218. See LAFAVE, supra note 81, § 2.1(d).
219. See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 868 (2004).
220. See FourthAmendment-Reasonable ExpectationofPrivacy, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179,
184 (2010) (highlighting the "courts' recent difficulty in handling the intersection of the
Fourth Amendment with technology").
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gy ... that could discern all human activity in the home."221 The
Court noted the dissent's argument that the thermal imaging device
used by police made only "off-the-wall" observations by assessing heat
radiating from the exterior of the house; thus, such actions were exposed
to the public. 2 Although the Court admitted that the technology was
not particularly sophisticated, the Court held that the home has
traditionally been considered a constitutionally protected area and
should be guarded against "more sophisticated systems that are already
in use or in development. 223 Thus, the Court's desire to protect the
integrity of the home was driven by a fear of future technology that
could effectively allow police to view all details of the home. 2 4
More recently, the Court, in City of Ontario v. Quon,22 s openly
expressed their qualms about the implication of deciding a case on
Fourth Amendment grounds when intertwined with technology.22 6 In
Quon the City of Ontario, California SWAT team issued two-way
alphanumeric pagers to their employees, including SWAT member Jeff
Quon. The police department investigated Quon's over-usage of the
phone to determine whether the limits on the number of characters were
too low; however, the department found that most of the messages were
not work-related but sexually explicit messages to his ex-wife and a
female co-worker. After being disciplined, Quon sued the City of Ontario
for violations of right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court noted that it "must proceed with care" when evaluating the
reasonable expectation of privacy standard with regard to new technology.228 The Court warned that "[tihe judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging

221. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36.
222. Id.
223. Id. Justice Scalia noted that unlike searches of "telephone booths, automobiles,
or even the curtilage," the Katz test is well-defined for the interior of the home such that
a "minimal expectation of privacy ... exists," and "[it] is acknowledged to be reasonable."
Id at 34.
224. See id. at 34 (noting that the issue of the case was "what limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy," or the interior of the
home).
225. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
226. See FourthAmendment-ReasonableExpectationofPrivacy, supra note 220, at 179
("(I]nstead of clarifying whether a government employee enjoys a reasonable expectation
of privacy when using government-issued equipment, the Court provided no helpful
guidance for similar cases in the future, declining to decide whether the Fourth
Amendment provides such a reasonable expectation of privacy in technological contexts.").
227. Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2625-26.
228. Id. at 2629.
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technology before its role in society has become clear."229 The Court
recognized that cell phone and text message communications are so
widespread in the workplace that they may be construed as "necessary
instruments for self-expression" as to warrant a reasonable expectation
of privacy.21s The unpredictable repercussions of expanding this
privacy right, however, precluded the Court from ruling on the issue."'
Instead, the Court held, arguendo, that Quon had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, but that his Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated regardless because a search of a government employee is
considered reasonable if done "for a noninvestigatory, work-related
purpos [e]."232

These cases demonstrate the Court's reluctance to make a ruling with
respect to technology that would disturb the status-quo. In Kyllo that
meant defending the home as a sanctuary from Fourth Amendment
intrusion; even if the technology at issue did not possess the capabilities
to portray the "intimate details of the home," the Court contended that
future technology could arise to this level. 33 In Quon it meant failing
to provide clear guidance under the Fourth Amendment-whether
government employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy with
government-issued devices-because of an uncertainty of how advancing
technology would change social norms in the workplace.23 4 While the
decision in Kyllo may seem to broaden the Court's perspective on Fourth
Amendment protections, the Court has declared that vehicles do not
share the same kind of protection, and that one does not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy while traveling in a vehicle along
public roads.235 Thus, the Court's current technology-Fourth Amendment complex may preclude a ruling on the issue altogether or could
restrain the Court from veering from the traditional rule with respect to
vehicles in public streets because of the apprehension of foreclosing other
police devices to track defendants, at least in the public domain.
C.

The Ramifications of a Judicial Ruling
To definitively rule on the issue of GPS surveillance, the Supreme
Court would need to take measures to narrowly craft its rule to prevent
certain unintended consequences. A prerequisite warrant requirement

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id. at 2630.
Id.
Id. at 2630-31 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See generally 533 U.S. 27.
See generally 130 S.Ct. 2619.
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
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for all uses of GPS monitoring based on the current Court precedent
could raise more questions than it answers. First, if the Court, like the
D.C. Circuit in Maynard, bases its holding on the fact that prolonged
GPS surveillance can yield a plethora of information about a person's
routine, then a defendant could potentially assert a Fourth Amendment
violation in other circumstances in which police have used ordinary
means, such as visual surveillance, to collect equivalent information. In
fact, the D.C. Circuit in Maynard anticipated this inquiry but chose to
"reserve the lawfulness of prolonged visual surveillance as it was not a
necessary determination in the decision before the Court."236 Second,
the Supreme Court would have to establish whether the warrant
requirement is triggered in every instance in which law enforcement
utilizes GPS monitoring or if it is permissible to use this technology
without a warrant under limited circumstances, such as when the police
use the GPS device for a relatively brief period of time or when the
device is used in conjunction with traditional police surveillance.
The first problem with a Supreme Court decision classifying GPSmonitoring as a search is if police officers actually did conduct a
prolonged search without the assistance of technology, does this nakedeye surveillance similarly require a warrant?3 . In other words, if
police engage in traditional police methods to track the defendant for
long periods of time without a warrant, do they risk a violation of one's
Fourth Amendment rights? Although the D.C. Circuit in Maynard
declined to answer this question, the court recognized that by predicating its decision on the extended use of GPS technology, the court risked
"a contrary holding [that] might at first blush seem to implicate a
different but intuitively permissible practice."2 38 The D.C. Circuit held
that requiring a warrant for prolonged GPS surveillance is justified
because its use "reveals types of information not revealed by short-term
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not
do, and what he does ensemble."23 9 Despite a sound reasoning for that
particular set of facts, however, the rationale can be extended to
situations when law enforcement conducts long periods of visual
surveillance in the absence of a warrant.
In fact, the Supreme Court acknowledged in Knotts that the "scientific
enhancement"-the beeper-"raise [d] no constitutional issues which visual

236. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 566.
237. Id. ("This case does not require us to, and therefore we do not, decide whether a
hypothetical instance of prolonged visual surveillance would be a search subject to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.").
238. Id.
239. Id. at 562.

2011]

HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT

1273

surveillance would not also raise."24 0 Thus, this seems to indicate that
if traditional police surveillance or searches were on par with technological advances, then those actions would also raise constitutional concerns.
For instance, consider a case in which a law enforcement officer
vigilantly follows a defendant day and night to his home and place of
work and leisure for a month, meticulously recording his time and
location. It is possible that the defendant could argue this intensive
form of surveillance, unaided by technology, violated his reasonable
expectation of privacy-to be free from the police collecting a detailed
"pattern or mosaic" of the defendant's life.24' A slippery slope could
arise as this approach "would prohibit not only GPS-augmented
surveillance, but any other police surveillance of sufficient length to
support consolidation of data" demonstrating a pattern of a person's
life.24 2 Thus, the actions of investigators that would have never been
considered a search previously-the visual surveillance of a person's
conduct voluntarily exposed to the public-could potentially come under
the umbrella of Fourth Amendment protection.
The Court also faces a difficult task in defining the extent to which
GPS surveillance constitutes a search. As stated, the D.C. Circuit in
Maynard limited its holding to the prolonged use of GPS surveillance
that was used to show a pattern of drug trafficking. 24 4 In fact, in
Maynard the evidence obtained through the use of a GPS-enabled
tracking device was essential to the Government's case; the Government
proved the case by circumstantial evidence, linking Jones's cell phone
calls made to co-conspirators to his presence at places of known drug
activity acquired through the GPS readings collected over a month's
span.24 5 Therefore, "[piresumably, had the GPS device been used for

240. 460 U.S. at 285 (emphasis added) (noting that based on the facts in Knotts, "there
[was] no indication that the beeper was used ... in any way that would not have been
visible to the naked eye from outside the cabin").
241. See United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 769 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, J.,
dissenting).
242. Id.
243. But see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2 ("The fact that equivalent information could
sometimes be obtained by other means does not make lawful the use of means that violate
the Fourth Amendment.").
244. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. In Maynard the court stated,
"The [Supreme] Court actually reserved the issue of prolonged surveillance....
Here the police used the GPS device not to track Jones's 'movements from one
place to another' but rather to track Jones's movements 24 hours a day for 28 days
as he moved among scores of places, thereby discovering the totality and pattern
of his movements from place to place to place."
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).
245. Id. at 567-68.
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an hour or perhaps a day, or whatever period the panel believed was
consistent with a normal surveillance, the evidence obtained could have
been admitted without [a] Fourth Amendment problem." 246 Thus, it
is unclear whether the Maynard decision would have changed the
outcome of the other circuit court cases or how it will affect different
For example, consider the fact
factual situations in the future."
patterns of two recent district court cases.
4 law enforcement
In the first case, United States v. Jesus-Nunez,"
attached a GPS to the underside of the defendant's vehicle, using the
device to track him for nearly eleven months. The device recorded the
time, date, and precise location of 4,307 registered stops, only a few of
In
which were relevant to the drug trafficking investigation.'
a
GPS
FBI
attached
the
Sparks,"o
comparison, in United States v.
device to the underside of the vehicle after suspecting Sparks had
committed three prior armed robberies within the past three months.
Eleven days after the FBI attached the GPS device, the suspect
committed another burglary. Agents were lying in wait and witnessed
the suspects as they switched into the getaway car equipped with the
GPS unit. In pursuit of the suspects, agents maintained visual
surveillance, depending on the GPS device only when they lost visual
contact with the vehicle during the high-speed chase.251
The first case, Jesus-Nunez, resembles Maynard in that the search
was prolonged and invasive in an attempt to connect the defendant to
a drug conspiracy.252 In contrast, in Sparks, although the GPS was
used for more than a single day, "[tihe relevant uses of the GPS device
were to locate the vehicle on a public street . .. and to reestablish visual
surveillance on Interstate 95."253 The Middle District of Pennsylvania

in Sparks aptly held that the rationale of Maynard is "readily distinguishable" in this situation as the defendant's right to be free from the
collection of private information about his routine and way of life were

246. Jones, 625 F.3d at 769.
247. See Orin S. Kerr, Petitionfor CertiorariFiled in Pineda-Moreno, The Ninth Circuit
GPS Case, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2010, 3:00 PM) ("[Tihere isn't a clear split
between Maynard and Pineda-Moreno. Maynard says that short-term GPS monitoring is
fine, and it's only long-term monitoring (the exact length unknown) that becomes a
search-and even then, it may be that no warrant is required. It's not clear that applying
Maynard's approach to the facts of Pineda-Morenoleads to a different result.").
248. No. 1:10-CR-00017-01, 2010 WL 2991229 (M.D. Pa. July 27, 2010).
249. Id. at *1, *4.
250. 750 F. Supp. 2d 384 (D. Mass. 2010).
251. Id. at 385-86.
252. Compare Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, with Jesus-Nunez, 2010 WL 2991229.
253. 750 F. Supp. 2d at 391.
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not threatened.2 54 Instead, the court held that the case is akin to
Knotts because the GPS was used, for the most part, to aid the FBI in
doing what they are lawfully permitted to do through visual surveillance.255 Thus, as novel as the decision in Maynard appears on its
face, the decision is molded around the particular facts of that case and
will not affect all cases in which law enforcement use a GPS device
without first obtaining a warrant. 256 This could potentially cause
confusion for investigators in determining whether to procure a warrant
and after what period of time the use of a GPS without a warrant
constitutes a search.
Therefore, in shaping a holding, the Supreme Court would have to
delineate the proper blend of GPS surveillance and traditional police
methods, like visual surveillance, in tracking a person that could be used
without encroaching upon that individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy. One possible method that may avert the extrapolation to longterm visual surveillance would be to prohibit wholesale GPS surveillance
that fully replaced any kind of in-person police work. Thus, the use of
GPS surveillance to augment law enforcement's visual surveillance in
the midst of catching a burglar in a high-speed chase would not require
a warrant prior to placing the GPS. In contrast, the blanket use of a
GPS device over an extended period of time-like a month or a year-in
an attempt to ascertain a pattern in the person's whereabouts in
connection with a drug conspiracy would require a warrant based on
probable cause.
If the Court does hold that the use of GPS is a search, such that it
violates society's reasonable expectation of privacy triggering a warrant
requirement, the Court may also need to consider the defendant's burden
of proof when attempting to suppress information derived from law
enforcement's wrongful use of GPS surveillance. Some scholars posit
that the defendant's burden of proof as to the first prong of Katz,
whether the defendant subjectively believed his actions would be
concealed from view, relates to the length of time of the surveillance.2 57
Thus, a defendant observed for an "extremely brief period" through GPS
surveillance might have to proffer evidence of an attempt to hide their
behavior "to overcome the acknowledged reality that when we travel in

254. Id. at 395.
255. Id.
256. See Maynard,615 F.3d at 566 (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227, 238 n.5 (1986)) ("Fourth Amendment cases must be decided on the facts of each case,
not by extravagant generalizations.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
257. Hutchins, supra note 94, at 455.
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public discrete portions of our trip are visible to those we pass." 8 The
relationship between the defendant's burden and the length of surveillance takes into account the fact that short-term GPS surveillance of a
defendant's vehicle does not present the same kind of problems as the
extended use because it fails to capture an "intimate picture of [a
subject's life," but simply pinpoints the defendant's location during a
short, purposeful period of monitoring.25 9 Without articulating the
definition of "prolonged" or "twenty-four hour surveillance" the Court
risks imposing a standard that even those who are strong privacy
supporters concede does not apply to all uses of GPS surveillance.
D. Using CongressionalAction to Resolve the Privacy Concerns of
GPS Surveillance
In light of the aforementioned concerns that could potentially arise if
the issue of GPS surveillance is left for judicial review, Congress should
instead furnish the substantive requirements for obtaining a warrant for
the use of a GPS-enabled tracking device. The Court has long acknowledged Congress's ability, through direct legislation, to provide privacy
protections beyond the Fourth Amendment.260 For example, after the
Supreme Court held, in Olmstead v. United States,2 61 that the Fourth
Amendment did not protect against the interception of telephone
conversations,26 2 Congress responded by passing the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (FCA),263 which made wiretapping evidence
inadmissible in court. 264
After the Supreme Court decisions in Katz v. United States2 " and
Berger v. New York 2" articulated a warrant requirement for wiretap-

258. Id.
259. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563.
260. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928) ("Congress may, of
course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them, when intercepted,
inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials, by direct legislation.") overruled by Katz,
389 U.S. 347, and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); see also Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment, supra note 212, at 806 ("1]egislative privacy rules governing new technologies
[are] quite often more protective than, parallel Fourth Amendment rules. Judicial deference
has often invited Congressional regulation.").
261. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
262. Id. at 466, 469.
263. Pub. L. No. 416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 605
(2006)).
264. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment, supra note 219, at 846; see also Nardone v. United
States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937) (holding that the FCA prohibited wiretapping by law
enforcement in procuring evidence).
265. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
266. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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ping,2 67 Congress strengthened these principles by laying out specific
requirements, beyond the Fourth Amendment, for seeking a warrant.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
(OCCSSA)2 68 arose in response to debate concerning the balance
between an effective method of extracting wiretapping evidence and the
need to keep this policing power in check.269 Before the OCCSSA,
state law varied greatly in the extent to which it offered protection from
wiretapping; however, through Title III Congress expressed its intent to
set the standard for electronic surveillance laws, whereby states could
pass more stringent requirements but must meet the minimum federal
protections. 27 0 This created a fairly uniform standard with state
wiretapping laws modeled after their federal counterparts. Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 2518,271 government agents can use a wiretap only upon
obtaining from a federal district court judge a so-called "super warrant"
that goes above an ordinary search warrant. 7' For instance, these
warrants require not only probable cause that a person "is committing,
has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense," but also
probable cause that information from communications concerning the
offense will be obtained and that "normal investigative procedures have
been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed
if tried or to be too dangerous. 2 73
Just as Congress bolstered wiretapping protections through legislation,
Congress should similarly mandate the warrant requirement for the use
of GPS devices, imposing a probable cause, or at least reasonable
suspicion, standard. Although the government may argue such GPS
surveillance tactics are imperative in the collection of evidence, a
statutorily required court order would force government officials to put
forth justification for the use of the device, rather than simply engaging
in a "fishing" expedition while tracking the defendant over an inordinate
amount of time for any missteps. Thus, the applicable standard should
also be directly related to the length of time the device is to be used;
exigent circumstances may require its use to follow a defendant in the
midst of an ongoing crime in which a probable cause standard would not
be appropriate.
267. Compare Katz, 389 U.S. at 358-59, with Berger, 388 U.S. at 63-64.
268. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 212-23 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2510-2520 (2006)).
269. JAMES G. CARR, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
270. Id. § 2:39.
271. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006).

§ 2:1

(2006).

272. In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location
Authority, 396 F. Supp. 2d 747, 751 (2005).
273. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (3)(a), (c).
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Like the federal wiretapping laws, other police tactics such as
traditional visual surveillance or the use of less invasive technology,
such as beepers, should be exhausted before resorting to GPS technology.
Also important are time requirements for when the warrant must be
executed and when the warrant expires (and if it does, whether evidence
collected during the use of the GPS device in this interim must be
suppressed). Rather than the Court creating sublevels of rules through
case law to account for the complexities of GPS technology, legislation
elicits a relatively timely and flexible response. Federal legislation also
enables Congress to develop a model for state legislatures to create their
own laws requiring agents of the state to abide by the warrant standard
when using GPS technology.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment argues that "[tihe right of the people to be secure ...
against unreasonable searches and seizures"2 74 is not a broad enough
brush to protect citizens from law enforcement's warrantless use of GPS
technology. The disparities between the uses of GPS devices in the
detection of crime, from chasing a criminal in hot pursuit to tracking a
defendant's whereabouts for days or months on end, demonstrates the
difficulties in pinning down a rule that effectively balances an individual's need for privacy and the government's desire to curtail crime by
using modern technology that allows the government to remain
undetected, yet incredibly efficient. Even if the Court extends Fourth
Amendment protection to the use of GPS devices, this extension would
open Pandora's box to questions regarding when a person's actions,
committed within the discerning eye of the public, are no longer free rein
for police discovery. Thus, following a tradition of Congress in creating
privacy protections over and above the Fourth Amendment guarantees,
such as the nation's wiretapping laws, Congress should promulgate a
detailed, unequivocal standard that gives the substantive and procedural
requirements for when law enforcement may use GPS technology to
secretly track a defendant. The legislative approach would ensure that
law enforcement has satisfied the proper requirements for securing a
warrant when using a GPS device, while at the same time assuaging
public fear that the government could at any time, or for any proper or
improper reason, track an unsuspecting individual's every move.
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